Business model analysis for a Sugar Company
Four
possible business models for a sugar company
Sugar companies are
increasingly diversifying and de-risking their revenue streams by manufacturing
ethanol from molasses and co-generating power from bagasse.
At present, there
are four possible business models for a sugar company. These are as follows:
·
A
company can be a plain vanilla sugar manufacturer, that is, manufacture sugar
and sell the by-products (molasses and bagasse) obtained in the course of
manufacture without any value addition. This is the sugar-molasses-bagasse
model.
·
A
company can convert molasses into alcohol and further process the same into
ethanol. It may opt not to forward integrate into the manufacture of power.
This is called the sugar-ethanol-bagasse model.
·
A
company can go in for bagasse-based cogeneration of power, but decide not to
convert molasses into alcohol/ethanol. This could be referred to as the
sugar-molasses-power model.
·
A
company may opt to forward integrate into complete value addition of
by-products, that is, produce sugar, alcohol/ethanol and power. It may continue
to sell a certain quantum of molasses and bagasse in the open market, but it
will also have the facilities for processing molasses into alcohol/ethanol and
bagasse into power. This could be termed the sugar-ethanol-power model.
Returns
from alternative business models
Sugar
companies have been diversifying their business models and derisking their
revenue streams by setting up facilities for producing alcohol/ethanol (from
molasses) and for co-generating power (utilising bagasse). After conducting a
detailed analysis of the four possible business models a sugar company can
follow, CRISIL Research concludes that forward integration into power and
ethanol enables mills to generate higher average profits over the length of the
sugar cycle.
We have analysed
the incremental profitability and returns from alternative business models in
three possible scenarios —an upward cycle in the industry, that is, sugar
supply is low and prices are high; a normal scenario of moderate supply and
prices; and a cyclical downturn in the industry, that is, supply is high and
prices are low.
We have made
product pricing and cost assumptions for each of these three scenarios. We have
assumed that realisations earned on the sale of sugar would be at Rs
13,500-18,500 per tonne, molasses prices would vary between Rs 500-3,500 per
tonne, alcohol/ethanol sales realisations would
be at Rs 18,500-24,000 per kilo litre, while bagasse prices would be Rs 100-800
per tonne.
In a normal scenario, we have assumed sugar sales realisation of Rs
16,000 per tonne, molasses prices of Rs 1,500 per tonne, average alcohol prices
of Rs 21,500 per tonne, and bagasse prices of Rs 400 per tonne. The realisation
per unit of power sold has been taken as Rs 3.2 per unit, and the price of
sugarcane has been assumed at Rs 1,200 per tonne.
It is to be noted that the prices and costs we have assumed are
indicative in nature. Actual figures would vary from region to region and from
company to company.
In addition, sugar mills are entitled to receive tradable carbon credits
(certified emission reductions (CERs)) under the clean development mechanism of
the Kyoto Protocol, since power cogeneration plants produce renewable energy
through the non-carbon route. We have not considered this in our calculations,
as mills have to obtain several approvals before they are eligible to receive
CERs.
In the normal scenario, we have assumed that a plant with a capacity to
crush 5,000 tonnes of sugarcane per day (5,000 tcd), will operate for 156 days
at 90 per cent capacity utilisation, crushing a total of 702,000 tonnes of
sugarcane. Further, we have assumed that the upcycle mills will crush 8 per
cent more as compared to the normal scenario; the downcycle mills will crush 8
per cent more cane as compared to the normal scenario.
Recovery and other input-output ratios have been considered at standard
industry norms. Further, we have assumed that a mill forward integrating into
the manufacture of alcohol/ethanol and/or power will process 100 per cent of
its molasses production into alcohol/ethanol and 100 per cent of its bagasse
output into power.
|
SMB
|
SEB
|
SMP
|
SEP
|
PBIT Margins
|
|
|
|
|
Upcycle
|
18%
|
20%
|
20%
|
22%
|
|
7%
|
12%
|
14%
|
18%
|
Downcycle
|
-9%
|
-1%
|
4%
|
10%
|
Average
margin (weighted)
|
5%
|
10%
|
12%
|
16%
|
|
|
|
|
|
Return on capital employed
|
|
|
|
|
Upcycle
|
15%
|
15%
|
13%
|
13%
|
|
5%
|
8%
|
8%
|
10%
|
Downcycle
|
-6%
|
0%
|
2%
|
5%
|
Average RoCE
(weighted)
|
5%
|
7%
|
7%
|
9%
|
SMB: Sugar-molasses-bagasse;SEB: Sugar-ethanol-bagasse;SMP:
Sugar-molasses-power;
|
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SEP: Sugar-ethanol-power
|
|
|
|
|
Note:
|
|
|
|
|
This is a hypothetical example. Actuals may vary.
|
|
|
|
|
Weights for calculating average: Upcycle (2 years),
|
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Source: Industry and CRISIL
Research
|
|
|
|
|
We can conclude the
following from the above table:
·
It
makes sound business sense to opt for an integrated business model, where a
mill produces not only sugar but also alcohol, ethanol and power; average
profits are higher (over a complete cycle) and variation in profits is also
lower than that of a plain vanilla sugar mill producing sugar, molasses and
bagasse. This is because earnings from the sale of alcohol/ethanol and power
are relatively stable and are non-cyclical compared to the core sugar business
(power prices are not volatile since they are decided on the basis of long-term
agreements. The price of ethanol sold to oil-marketing companies, for the
ethanol-blending programme, is fixed on the basis of quantity-based tenders).
·
Processing
molasses into alcohol/ethanol and undertaking bagasse-based co-generation of
power helps, to some extent, in protecting revenues and improving profitability
during periods of downturn in the core sugar business. For example, in 2006-07,
sugar prices fell sharply due to oversupply in the market, but alcohol and
power prices were relatively stable. During this period, when the sugar
business was doing badly, these products contributed heavily to profitability.
·
However,
opting for value addition of bagasse and molasses, could generate lower returns
on incremental capital employed (compared to a standalone sugar mill) when the
industry is in an upturn. For instance, during a period sugar shortage in
2004-05, several sugar mills were finding the sale of molasses and bagasse more
profitable than the sale of alcohol or power.
·
Opting
for a sugar-molasses-power or sugar-alcohol-power model would generate higher
profits for sugar companies over a cycle. The business risk in opting for these
models is also lower, given the lesser variation in profits. However, sugar
mills could prefer to set up a distillery unit first rather than a
co-generation plant, due to the lower capital expenditure requirement for
establishing a distillery unit.
Our conclusions
must, however, be viewed in the light of the following:
·
The
decision of a sugar mill to opt for an integrated business model or to remain a
standalone plain vanilla sugar mill is often a function of its long-term
strategy and vision. Prices and costs at particular point of time do not
necessarily influence business decisions, which are taken with a long-term
view.
·
Past
experiences or future expectations also govern decisions. For example, several
mills are hesitant to opt for power co-generation in view of the unpleasant
experiences that some of them had in the form of delay in receiving payments
from state electricity boards against supply of power. There is also a fear
among some mills that realisations on power sales may drop in the coming years.